

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

**AMBASSADOR MARSHALL GREEN**

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*  
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## INTERVIEW

*Q: This is an interview with Ambassador Marshall Green, concerning his period as population coordinator at the Department of State between 1975 and 1979.*

*Mr. Ambassador, we've had numerous interviews, but this interview is devoted to your time in something which is beyond the normal concept of a traditional diplomat, which you certainly were. How did you move to this position of population coordinator in the Department of State?*

GREEN: Stu, all my life, as far as I can recollect, in my thinking and studies I've been interested in population-related issues, what you might call demographic pressures and how they affect nations and lives of individuals. I felt, having served in six posts in East Asia and the Pacific, and

six posts in Washington related to that area, I had felt that inadequate attention was being paid to this very fundamental problem. Quite clearly, population pressures had a great deal to do with poverty, malnutrition, the inability of countries to save enough in order to develop. In other words, they had to spend so much money on infrastructure to provide for rapidly expanding populations, that nothing was left over for development. I felt that it had a direct bearing on environmental degradation, which was of increasing concern.

All these things I felt, but it wasn't until I was assigned as ambassador to Indonesia that I felt so strongly about it in terms of the problems that Indonesia faced.

Q: *When were you in Indonesia?*

GREEN: I was ambassador to Indonesia from 1965 to 1969. During that time, there was an abortive coup by the communists, which was put down, and it ridded the country of negative, rather hostile forces, of which Sukarno was the leader, in which the Communists were the principal participants. It was replaced by a sane and sensible government headed by General Suharto, who became president, and still is president of the country.

Shortly after the aborted coup, I was in touch with Suharto, but only indirectly. It wasn't until May 1966, which was nine months later after the coup, that I had my first meeting with Suharto. He called me to his offices. That was the only time that I ever went to his office; all subsequent meetings were in his home. But that time I went to his office. I didn't know what he was going to raise with me. The first substantive subject that he raised was in regard to population. In effect, he asked me for \$500 million, US, grant or loan, to help transport the excess population from the island of Java, on which at that time there were about 60 million people--today there are over 100 million people--on an island the size of the state of New York, to transport them to what they called the outer islands, and resettle them there--Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, New Guinea, and other islands in Indonesia, which consists of 3,000 islands. In other words, to vent the surplus population in Java onto outlying islands.

I was appalled by this idea of trying to move masses of people from Javanese, setting and culture to outer islands, because I knew from my own experience that this kind of thing just doesn't work. We had tried it at the request of the Japanese in the case of Okinawa at one time, when we were dealing with the occupation of Japan. So I told General Suharto, "This is a very difficult problem. Even if the Queen Mary (the largest passenger liner at that time) were to leave the island of Java every day, loaded down with people, it couldn't take care of the natural increase in population in that one day on Java." That was the proportion of the problem, quite apart from the fact that trying to resettle in other islands entailed all kinds of difficulties and expenses. I alluded to the fact that quite clearly, a population stabilization program on the island of Java was the first step and the most important step to take. He agreed with that.

Because I was so interested, I had already been in touch with people in the family-planning field in Jakarta. They were mostly ladies in Jakarta whose husbands had some stature and position in the government or in private industry. I told President Suharto about the family-planning organizations in Java that I knew about, and suggested that this might be the first step I hoped

they would take, and that I thought our government would be very supportive of efforts they would take in this field, and I certainly would report our conversation to our government. That was the first of many, many meetings that I had with President Suharto on population over the next quarter century including in retirement. Shortly after that conversation in 1966, Indonesia began what turned out to be one of the world's most effective population programs. I like to think that I had something to do with helping to inspire and give encouragement to the program. It was a humane program and it's been an effective program.

Shortly after this conversation with Suharto, he invited me out to the rice harvesting ceremonies. This would have been roughly in August of 1966. He invited me out to the opening of the rice harvesting ceremonies in western Java, not far from Jakarta. I drove out there with him and his wife and quite a large retinue. Meanwhile, all the villagers along the northern plains of Java were coming out as villages to harvest the rice in the adjoining paddy fields. It was a very colorful occasion. As far as eye could see, villagers were moving to the fields under flags.

But the thing that arrested my attention was the fact that each one of the harvesters, including President Suharto and myself, were given a little knife called an aniani knife. We tied that around the middle finger, and each blade of rice was cut separately. This was done by everyone. I said, "Why don't you use scythes and sickles? It would be much more efficient." President Suharto told me that if they did that, they would throw tens of thousands of people out of work. To stretch out the work and make everybody involved, required that they harvest the rice this way. Similarly, they were not using mechanical pounders for the rice. They were all doing it by hand pounding. This involved something like 50,000 jobs. So merely to spread the work out, they were using these very labor-inefficient methods.

You could see right away that if a country was going to progress, it had to move into modern technology, but modern technology would throw hundreds of thousands of people out of work, tearing the social fabric of the country apart, and might lead to revolutions. Therefore, you could see right away how pressures of population entailed these results.

On another occasion, I had word from the Minister of Health that they had an outbreak of bubonic plague in central Java, that this was a very dangerous situation, that they had to move in right away, otherwise bubonic plague, unattended, does progress into the second stage known as pneumonic plague, which is the same as Black Death, which decimated Europe at one time. Therefore, you had to move very rapidly against bubonic plague in these situations.

He asked me if the American government could help. I immediately wired Washington, suggested that the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta be contacted to see if they could send out some doctors right away.

If you can believe it, within 48 hours of that telephone call, there were in Indonesia 14 American doctors. Maybe I'm exaggerating, but it certainly was no more than 72 hours that we had a U. S. team there.

I joined the Minister of Health in visiting these doctors at work in central Java, where they had to trap rats, comb the hair of the dead rats for the ticks, and make a serum out of the dead ticks to inoculate the people, which they did with the help of a lot of technicians and medical support. I stayed with those doctors for a day or two, and I saw the utter poverty in which people were living in the rural areas infected by this plague. I saw sheer poverty. I saw masses of children. I saw the limited opportunities that those children had, and the limited space in which they could grow things as farmers. It made a deep impression on me.

That's why, 8 years later, when I was ambassador to Australia, I decided that I wanted to get involved in the population field full time. That led up to a decision to part company with traditional diplomacy and get involved in a field in which American diplomats and other diplomats had rarely ventured, and where the participation of diplomacy, it seemed to me, was very important if you were going to have an effective attack on a problem that involved government leaders, their representatives abroad, and many more disciplines than appeared to be involved in dealing with this problem at that time.

*Q: We're now talking about 1975?*

GREEN: Yes. This would have been almost ten years after that first meeting with Suharto. Meanwhile, I'd been ambassador to Indonesia for four years and Assistant Secretary of State for four years under Nixon, and then I was assigned to Australia as ambassador. It was while I was there that I realized that my days in the State Department were numbered, that I wanted to be involved in something important, of lasting value, to which I was deeply committed, not just in my remaining years in the State Department, but in the years of retirement. So that had something to do with the decision, but there were other reasons for doing so, too.

*Q: What were they?*

GREEN: One was a personal reason. My wife and I wanted to get back to Washington. Our youngest son needed parental help and guidance, and we felt we had to get back there. That was certainly one reason. The other reason, of course, was the one I've already mentioned, which was the compelling interest that I had in this issue and the feeling that there were not the right levels of attention being given the problem. It was too exclusively in the hands of doctors and demographers and family-planning experts. So that was the decision that I made. Then I began to sound out the Department as to whether I could get a job in this field while I was still in Australia.

*Q: Where did population matters rest within the American Government, particularly the State Department at that point?*

GREEN: Within the State Department, population was in the hands of a population advisor to the Secretary of State. It had been Bob Barnett, who had worked with Dean Rusk, who was extremely interested in this subject. Then Phil Claxton had taken over as population advisor, working more and more within the confines of the bureaucracy and less in the kind of position that Bob Barnett had at one time, where he was dealing directly with a Secretary of State who

was keenly interested in this subject. Phil Claxton was very dedicated, highly knowledgeable, and had considerable influence on this subject within our government.

As to the government departments that were principally involved, obviously the State Department was involved, but particularly AID. AID at that time had program money running around \$100 million a year that was devoted essentially to population, family-planning-related activities. That money was going into programs that were being conducted partly by governments, but also partly by non-governmental organizations. So a lot of the money was going to either the United Nations or to private organizations, and maybe less than half was going directly to governments in support of their programs.

AID felt that this was their province, their concern. The State Department, in the person of Phil Claxton, felt that it was something broader than that. Therefore, when I was assigned to Washington in this field, for the first time someone of ambassadorial rank was going to be involved in this issue. Therefore, I wrote to Hugh Appling, who at that time was a Foreign Service officer working as deputy to the director of the Foreign Service, and he was also deputy head of personnel, I wrote to him my hope that first of all, I wanted to be in population work, but secondly, to be influential, I should have direct access to the top, and I thought being special advisor to the Secretary of State would be the optimum, and/or being ambassador-at-large, dealing with population-related issues.

Meanwhile, I hadn't realized this was going on in Washington, but Henry Kissinger, who was then Secretary of State in the Ford Administration, wanted to reorganize the State Department to get rid of all special advisors. I think he was bothered by their having direct access to his office. He wanted to have all these special kinds of advisors--labor or whatever--assigned to a bureau, and it would be only the top of that bureau who would have access to his office and would come to his meetings.

Population, meanwhile, had been, you might say, downgraded while I was still in Australia, to being administratively under the Assistant Secretary for Oceans, Environment, and Science (OES) who at that time was Dixie Lee Ray, who later became governor of the state of Washington.

*Q: And not considered a very effective person.*

GREEN: She was not effective in that job. She was an able nuclear scientist, by the way, and her interests were in that field. Things like oceans and environment and population, which were also in her bureau, were not matters of particular interest to her. She was very jealous about having anybody on her staff that didn't speak through her to the Secretary.

So when I learned this, I became rather dissuaded from going ahead with this assignment. But meanwhile, there was an NSC paper that was being prepared, basically directed towards the World Population Conference in 1974, but never completed in time for that conference. The World Population Conference was to bring together, for the first time, leaders, at least at the ministerial level, of all 136 countries that existed in the world at that time, in Bucharest. Our delegation was headed by William Draper, who had a great deal of clout and political support.

The private organizations that were represented at the meeting were headed by John D. Rockefeller III. So we had at that time a delegation of considerable clout that was deeply concerned with world population problems and knowledgeable about them.

There was being concurrently developed in the National Security Council a paper known as NSDM 200, that outlined what our policies were going to be. This was largely to ensure the correlation of all government activities toward a single policy. This policy, like any other NSC policy, called for an NSDM which was really how the policy was going to be executed, and how it was going to be supervised, to ensure that it was being properly implemented. This was being left in the hands of the deputy secretary's committee.

Every government department had an under secretary or deputy secretary who was a member of this committee. It was headed by the Deputy Secretary of State, at that time Bob Ingersoll, who had, by the way, succeeded me as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs several years earlier, and was a close friend of mine. So I realized that this was an opportunity, since Bob Ingersoll wrote me a letter that he would name me as being the Coordinator for Population and as being the man in charge of ensuring that the government carried out this NSC policy. Eventually, it was called NSDM 314.

So on those grounds, I came back to Washington. You might say administratively I was under Dixie Lee Ray as the Assistant Secretary for OES, but functionally, in terms of the great majority of my work, I was directly under the Deputy Secretary of State and in charge of an NSC interagency task force on world population issues that was set up to ensure the execution of this National Security Council policy. It was in that capacity that I really operated. But of course, it gave rise to a lot of problems.

*Q: Why don't we talk a little about the problems, and then we'll go on. Sometimes this can be very important. How interested was Henry Kissinger in this? World population problems is something that's a decades-long business. Anybody dealing with this is not going to gain much fame by putting their political capital on the line for something of this nature.*

GREEN: Stu, I think you've answered the question to some extent. People like Henry Kissinger recognized that this was a very fundamental problem and that corrective measures should be taken, but they did not see this as being one of their principal functions, because they had so many other more immediate problems. It's an unwritten rule in all governmental bureaucracies that the short-term and procedural take precedence over the long-term and substantive.

No problem on the world's agenda is more long-range and substantive than population. Furthermore, trying to limit population growth is a highly sensitive subject. It tends to embroil you with the Catholic Church or to embroil you with other groups. Therefore, it is a little bit risky to get too far in front in this particular issue. Furthermore, the problem takes many, many years to get anywhere. It's a very intractable problem. It's a problem where government direction has only limited effect. Basically, you're asking that people make a decision to have fewer children, and that's something that the US Government has rather limited means of promoting, bearing in mind

that these are decisions that are taken in shacks and shanties and farmhouses all around the developing world. You're also dealing with different cultures and different attitudes.

So it's a very complex, difficult, long-range problem that, quite understandably, does not engage the attention of leaders, unless those leaders are very much motivated by doing that which in the long run is going to be best for mankind. If they have a long-range view, are selfless, highly principled and highly motivated, then you can expect that they are going to be attentive to this issue and are going to give you support. Unfortunately, we did not have those kinds of leaders in Washington when I was working on this subject. There were people that were interested, but I'm simply saying that you didn't find that in the White House; you didn't find that at the top levels of the State Department.

*Q: One of the attributes, supposedly, of a professional Foreign Service officer is that he or she can look at a culture, figure out where the centers of power are, and then how to use those and approach those in order to get something done. It's a foreign culture, but you're coming back, and the same skill should apply. You understand what the situation is within, actually, any government, the concern, but at the same time, the lack of feeling of having any accomplishment or reward for political leaders. Looking at this in 1965, did you analyze the situation and figure out how your approach was going to be in order to get something done?*

GREEN: When I took over the job, I had very little idea of how I was going to tackle the problem. I first had to learn a lot more about it, so that my first three months, you might say, were problems of very intense self-education. In the process of education, I learned that the people I was working with in AID, especially the population office in AID, were headed by a man who saw the issue in very narrow, family-planning terms, and who was promoting the idea that spreading the use and acceptance of contraceptives would be adequate in dealing with this problem.

The very first trip that I took in 1976 around the world to deal with population problems, I was completely disabused of ideas that were being promoted especially by Dr. Ravenholt, who was the head of AID's population office. He was a man to reckon with. He was very able and dynamic, he had a strong personality, a rather domineering personality. He had contacts on the Hill, and he had many people in the private organizations dealing with these issues who were beholden to him. He wielded power. I found myself immediately in a kind of clash with him, because what I was saying, in effect, is I didn't believe that the approach that he was advocating and taking was going to be anywhere near adequate, that family planning was good in itself in terms of ensuring that every child was a wanted child, but in terms of dealing with world population pressures that we were interested in in the State Department as well as in governments of other countries, family planning was simply not enough.

I found, for example, on a trip around the world, that in talking with specialists in this field, especially cultural anthropologists and economists in different countries, that they took a very different view from what AID took in Washington. They saw this in terms that I saw it.

When I got to Bangladesh in early 1976, which Henry Kissinger had only recently visited, he hadn't even mentioned the population problem at all, although everybody knew this was the number-one problem in Bangladesh. The government had said so, but he didn't bring it up yet he told the press afterwards that he thought Bangladesh was a "demographic basket-case."

So when I went to Bangladesh, I found that AID had promoted, and was still promoting, what they called a contraceptive inundation program. This was a program, backed with US money, that spread pills and condoms all over the country, and enlisted the support of the Bangladesh Government, through all local agencies of the government, in disseminating pills and condoms to men and women all over the countryside. Then they advertised the fact that 29% of the people were now using contraceptives. This had been introduced about a year earlier. By the time I got there, there were already clear indications that it had been a complete waste--if not complete, nearly complete waste--of effort and money.

I came across the same thing in Pakistan.

*Q: This was done by basically comparing birth statistics before and after the program?*

GREEN: No, it was not even that, because you didn't have that kind of data. It was simply based on how many people were using contraceptives. These were known as "user rates" or "contraceptive prevalence rates."

*Q: How would you know?*

GREEN: You'd only find out by making samplings of various places, by going around. They had family-planning workers, and they could find that out. They could find out whether So-and-so was using contraceptives or not. That was relatively easy to establish. But what you couldn't establish was the continued use of it. So that you had to wait a while. All I'm saying is that initially they were probably correct, that 29% of the people were using contraceptives. But within a year, it was back to 4% or 5%, which it was before the program was even launched. Maybe it was one or two points higher, but not much higher. It wasn't worth all the effort and money. It was not the right way to go at the problem, anyway.

When I got to Pakistan, I still, of course, had the rank of ambassador, and I was fairly well known in Asia. Our ambassadors always gave me great support. When I got to Pakistan, I was invited by the government to address their national council dealing with population programs. All the ministers involved--health, education, labor, and local governments and so forth--were there plus the prime minister. With my relatively new acquaintance with the problem, I was hesitant to speak. I didn't criticize their program, although I was inwardly critical. I didn't think they were doing anywhere near enough. They were approaching it the wrong way, and they were using AID's counsel, which I thought would never yield the results we sought or they sought. So what I did was I talked about Indonesia's program. I knew a lot about that program. Indonesia was a fellow Moslem country. My talk went over very well, to the point where Pakistan did send a delegation to Indonesia later on to see how they were doing. That is another question. But this was simply my initial impression.

When I came back to Washington, I met with the head of AID and some of his principal lieutenants, and I told them how I felt about our programs! Of course, this put me in direct conflict with the family-planning sections of AID, headed by Ravenholt. I was to be wrestling with that problem almost all during my years in the State Department. But increasingly, I found I had the support of people at the top of AID, especially Assistant Administrator Fred Pinkham, but I was still running up against resistance at lower levels.

*Q: Was the resistance one that you feel was philosophy, or were you breaking somebody's rice bowl? Was it a more quantifiable way--number of condoms distributed?*

GREEN: You're getting into a rather key question here. When NSC 200 had been drawn up originally and when NSDM 314 emerged from this and was agreed upon in November of 1975, AID had been strongly urging that the administrator of AID be named as the chief implementing officer of the policy. Since AID managed all USG money that was dealing with population, and since they had people in the field all over the world that were dealing with this kind of problem, they had a good claim to being coordinator of NSDM 314 implementation.

But Phil Claxton and Bob Ingersoll and others in the State Department weighed in against this line of thinking, on the grounds that population was a broader concern than just development; it was also a matter of broad socio-political-strategic concern to governments. Hence, you had to have somebody at a high diplomatic level to be coordinator. That was their argument, which eventually won the day. That's why I eventually was named to the job.

But it left a legacy of competitiveness and some antagonism that I had to contend with all the time. Obviously, I had to use diplomacy in dealing with AID. This was a very critical aspect of my job.

*Q: Our real diplomacy takes place either within an embassy or within the State Department, rather than abroad.*

GREEN: That's right.

*Q: Abroad, it's easy. It's internally where it's not.*

GREEN: I have often said that being an FSO in the field is fine. It requires the skills of smooth talk and urbanity and of reconciling differences in a harmonious way. But when you come to Washington, an FSO has got to be an "FSOB," because there he's really got to deal with all the other so-and-sos in other government departments, and that calls for skills that are quite different. It still calls for diplomacy, but a rather different kind of diplomacy.

Anyway, this did require a great deal of expenditure of efforts simply to smooth feathers down and to get things done, and to get the cooperation of people down the line.

On my task force that was dealing with the execution of this policy, we had an AID representative, and it usually was the assistant administrator in charge of health, population, refugee, and other work. He was on my committee. I might say I always enjoyed good support from him. Most of the time it was Fred Pinkham, who later devoted his retirement years full-time to population, finally as the president of the Population Crisis Committee.

I found that in other government departments that were on my committee, I had particularly good support from Chris Herter, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary in OES charged with environment, but population he saw as very much involved in environment. As a matter of fact, the very first speech I ever gave on population, when I was ambassador in Australia, was called "Population," which related population to environmental concerns. So I had in Chris Herter a very intelligent and able officer, who was the son of a former Secretary of State. He was my right-hand man in this committee.

Also I had on the committee representatives from CIA. CIA had a geographic branch that dealt with these kinds of problems, and they were highly knowledgeable and very supportive. They saw the problems exactly as I saw it, so I found their representative to be enormously helpful. CIA sometimes prepared background papers that were of use to our committee.

I also had very close connections with the Department of Agriculture, because the Department of Agriculture was in charge, obviously, with world food problems, and food and population at that time was considered to be the critical nexus. We had a subcommittee in my committee that dealt full-time with food and population. I was chairman of that, too. By the way, I came to see the population food issue as less and less of an immediate concern as compared to population and employment, population and poverty, population and environment, population and overcrowded cities which were breeding a great deal of rising but dashed expectations and, therefore, political unrest. These were the connections, particularly the last, that I became more and more concerned with. To go back to this interagency task force, we also had on it representatives of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those were two different representatives. They were very supportive, because I found that our military reflected the views of General Maxwell Taylor. He had been a very outspoken proponent of population programs in the world, had had a great deal of impact upon the thinking of the military. Also I had representatives of the National Science Foundation. They were also supportive. They saw this problem, too, very much the way I did. We also had the Department of Labor and Bureau of the Census. The White House had a representative there, Hal Horan, who was very helpful to me. So basically, we had a like-minded group, and we were molded into an effective functioning organization.

By the way, this interagency task force on world population became known later on as the NSC ad hoc group, of which I was the chairman. Our principal function was preparing an annual report. The annual report related back to this basic NSC policy, NSDM 200, and showed what was being done in its implementation. It also critiqued the programs of other countries, what were effective and what were not effective. What would be most effective? It therefore called upon the talents of many, many people, because we almost always got annual telegrams from ambassadors around the world in response to our circular telegram, telling us what they thought would be most effective in their country. So we drew upon the whole diplomatic community. We

had excellent support from the Foreign Service and from the assistant secretaries in the different State Department bureaus. So we had a great deal of inside information from our own sources. (N.B. The inter-agency committee was dissolved shortly after I retired in 1979.)

*Q: Did you find any dispute on how to go about dealing with this, you might say from the birth-control-device group? I'm speaking from the Foreign Service apparatus, that the way to do this was practically saturate countries with birth-control devices or to take a broader look or not. Was this a divisive problem, or was this mainly between you and AID?*

GREEN: It was not really a divisive problem insofar as the State Department-Foreign Service diplomatic personnel were concerned, particularly our ambassadors in the field. They saw this problem very much the way I did. Our problem really was with the population officials in AID who were handling this problem on a full-time basis and had a great deal of political clout, because they also commanded a lot of money. We didn't. They were giving the money to non-governmental organizations. A great deal of money was spent that way. They were also giving money to the United Nations Fund for Population Activity. They had a great deal of influence, therefore, with that key United Nations agency.

So we in State were operating without any kind of money but we did have the prestige of the US Government, and I tried to make it clear, when I was talking to other governments, that their ability to conduct effective, humane population programs would have considerable impact on the thinking of leaders in Washington and those in Congress and in the administration who determined aid allocations. I could say this. Whether or not it was true was another thing, because it was hard to say to what extent their effective dealing with this problem did, in fact, relate to the amount of money they got from the United States Government. I tried to make that connection, and I certainly gave the impression that there was a connection, but whether in fact it was true or not was something else again, because, as you know, aid allocations are very round-about complex business. When we put in a basic aid request for a country, almost two years elapses before it comes out the other end of the pipeline. You're dealing with an extremely complex mechanism when you're talking about AID. It was not a pleasant experience having to deal with funding issues and not having command over the funds that Congress was allocating.

To go back to your earlier question, I think that when it came to other government departments in our government, when it came to our Foreign Service and our mission directors, including AID mission directors in the field, they saw the problem much more in the way I did. When I say "I" did, most of us in the State Department saw it this way.

When I first took over this job in 1975, within two months of my assuming office, I sent out a circular telegram to all of our ambassadors in the developing world--that is, in Asia, Africa, Latin America--where this problem was rampant. It was not, of course, in Europe and North America or Japan. But in these developing countries, where population was exploding, I solicited our ambassadors views on a number of questions: How serious did they see this problem? What did they think would be most effective in dealing with it? Any recommendations?

The responses that we got to this first circular were impressive, because they made it very clear that our ambassadors and their staffs saw population as contributing in a major way to problems of poverty, unemployment, and unrest in the countries where they were stationed. They did not see it simply as a food and nutrition issue, but they saw it as a very fundamental problem that needed to be addressed, yet where very limited corrective action was being taken. Anything the United States could do to promote interest and support for population programs in their countries would be of great help.

*Q: Before I ask about how we operated overseas on this problem, there are a couple of other places in the domestic equation--Congress, church groups, Catholics, of course, but other church groups, and the president. How did they impact on your operation?*

GREEN: I didn't feel that President Ford (unlike President Carter) or most people on the White House staff in 1976 were interested or concerned on this issue, for the very obvious reason that it had no political benefits. In fact, it had certain political risks to get too much involved. By the way, we were not bothered at that time by the abortion issue. That was later on to be a terrible menace. But at that time, that was not the issue.

Family planning did have strong resistance, obviously, from the Vatican, even though we had reliable information that the use of modern contraception by Catholics in this country was almost as widespread as it was amongst Protestants. But the Vatican, nevertheless, had a very strident view on this thing. This was well known, and politicians didn't want to get involved in it, if for that reason only.

As to the NSC staff. Brent Scowcroft and Zbig Brzezinski were supportive, although they didn't do much about it. Hal Horan of the NSC was on my task force, and, as I said, was helpful.

Secretary of State Kissinger understood the importance of the problem, but he wasn't prepared to put his time and reputation on the line in pursuing it, though he wasn't going to in any way try to undermine my efforts. When I did call on Henry Kissinger one time, he was about to go to Africa. There was going to be a meeting of the Organization of African States that he was going to address in Nairobi. When I called on him, he said, "Marshall, I will do anything you tell me to at this conference on the subject. I recognize its importance. Just give me the talking points, and I'll take them up."

So I went back to my office and prepared talking points for him to make publicly and privately. The latter included the idea that we would judge countries' performance in terms of whether they were addressing this fundamental issue or not.

I have no way of knowing to what extent he carried out that latter, but I doubt he did anything. He did include in his public remarks certain allusions to the population problem and the need for addressing the issue. However, it was very muted. I don't think it had much impact. He wasn't particularly prepared to do anything about it; he just saw it as another damn problem that somebody else would have to handle.

As a matter of fact, when I was in Rio de Janeiro and I talked to our consul general there--I had known him for some time--he told me that Henry Kissinger and he had had a conversation about me, in which Henry had said he didn't understand why I had thrown away a promising future by getting involved in population issues. So that shows you, I think, pretty well what he felt about me and the problem. Later on, Secretary Cy Vance and President Carter were supportive but they were deeply preoccupied with issues of immediate concern like Cuba, Panama and Iran.

*Q: But to some extent, benign neglect of something allows you a certain amount of freedom to operate. It's much better than having much attention from the Secretary of State.*

GREEN: Except that my job was very much concerned with trying to get leaders interested, and if our Secretary of State and our President indicated no real interest in this thing, except of a pro forma nature, this immediately translated into a lessening of interest on the part of other countries at top levels. My power and my influence were related to the degree to which my leaders saw this as an important problem.

*Q: And your feeling was?*

GREEN: There was not the degree of interest that had been reflected, let's say, by Dean Rusk, who considered this to be a very important problem. Or even by LBJ, who saw increasingly this to be a very important problem, who was very interested, anyway, in conditions of poverty wherever they existed in the world. So was Hubert Humphrey who had a big heart.

It was also a very important issue in terms of women and women's rights. This brings me back, of course, to the substance of the problem: what do you do about it?

*Q: Could we talk about the other group, Congress?*

GREEN: On the Hill, there were certain senators who were interested, but not very, on whom I called to talk about this thing. But again, they were thinking largely in terms of aid funding, whether or not we should put more money into it. Of course, I was talking to that. But I did find a great deal of interest in the House of Representatives. There were about 30 or 40 congressmen and congresswomen who saw this as a very important issue. Probably Jim Schever of New York and Tony Bielsen of California were the most active, but there were others who were equally interested and concerned. They did hold hearings in 1978 on population, where I was a principal witness, and where they had a lot of good witnesses from all over. I'm saying, in other words, that Congress was interested, and especially a certain group of representatives, roughly 40, who saw this as a major problem and who were keenly interested. I talked to them quite often and had very close connections, particularly with Jim Schever.

I remember talking one time to a group of 20 congressmen at lunch, in which I was the guest of a congressman from California. I spoke very rapidly for about 20 minutes about the magnitude of the problem. Not one congressman left the room. Now, this is interesting, because I've done a great deal of briefings in other connections on the Hill, and congressmen wandered in and out.

But here, they all stayed, including some known critics of the program. But they remained. So I really felt that if we could only get through to these people.

I remember Father Drennan, for example, who, after all, was a Jesuit priest, but was very understanding.

*Q: He was a member of the House of Representatives.*

GREEN: He was very interested. So I felt that the potential on the Hill was strong. I might say that in subsequent years, that the interest on the part of the House of Representatives was probably stronger than it was in the administration, and that's true today. They repeatedly put more money into population for AID than the administration was asking for.

By the way, as these congressmen fanned out around the developing world, they began to understand this to be a very fundamental problem that needed to be addressed.

*Q: Did you make a point of telling your Foreign Service colleagues, "Get them out to see some of the problems"? Because a congressman is somewhat under the leash of whoever is escorting him around.*

GREEN: That's correct.

*Q: You can either take him to a slum or you can take him to a golf course.*

GREEN: For one thing, we used to brief--or at least the State Department would give a briefing--to the congressional group before it went out, and population would always be included in it. But more importantly, the ambassadors were supportive. What you suggested just now was indeed incorporated in our instructions to the field, and I'm sure that they exercised it since most felt the same way themselves.

One other thing about Congress. That was the Government Accounting Office, which, as you know, is a branch of Congress. I found that in the Government Accounting Office, there was particularly strong interest in what we were doing. One time I was invited to address all of the officers at GAO. Later the GAO began to critique government programs in terms of their attention or lack of attention to this problem.

*Q: You took this job in 1975. One could almost say this was when the women's movement, whatever you want to call it, was really coming into real flower and power at that time within the United States. Did this have an effect on your operation or not?*

GREEN: Very much so. We found that most women's organizations were interested. This was not a women's-lib issue. This was an issue of women's status and rights, and this brings us to the fundamental question, which we haven't really talked much about, of what one does to try to improve motivation for smaller families. What does one do about it?

Q: *That's the big question.*

GREEN: That's the big issue. It was set forth at the world population plan of action that emerged from World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, this document that was approved by the consensus of all 136 nations there, with the exception of Communist China and the Vatican. Curious exceptions, bearing in mind they had totally different views. Those were the only two that didn't agree to this world population plan of action that called for direct interventions and indirect interventions. The direct interventions were basically family planning, later-age marriages, especially for women, and breast-feeding, because that has the effect of spacing children automatically. Then it went in for what they call indirect interventions. This called for improving the economies of countries, because when countries begin to move ahead, when people have more money and better education and so forth, then there's almost an automatic tendency for fertility rates to decline.

But the most effective indirect intervention measure was improving the status and rights of women. There's almost a direct correlation--you might say an inverse proportion--between women's education and fertility rates. The higher the level of women's literacy, the lower the level of fertility. This is known as the Zorpa principle. Improving the status and rights of women was something we should do anyway. It was unassailable, indeed sacrosanct, something nobody could openly oppose. Hence, this would probably be the most effective single step that we could take.

I chaired a small group that was unrelated to this interagency task force. It just emerged *ad hoc*, consisting largely of women in the State Department, but also from AID and from USIS, which was very keen on this issue. The group was started in 1977. We met maybe every two or three months. I was sort of the chairman of the group. There emerged from our work a worldwide directive that instructed our ambassadors with regard to what they should do in terms of advancing the status and rights of women in the countries to which they were assigned. The way we did this was, first of all, asking the ambassadors their advice as to what would be most effective. So the directive we eventually sent out to them was based upon their own recommendations. Thus, we avoided a lot of pitfalls, because there are some countries where you have to be very careful. It also made the ambassadors feel that they were the architects of the policies they were executing. This was diplomacy at its best.

Q: *We're talking about the very heart of diplomacy, and that is to get away from the tendency of management, "A" versus "B" type of management. "A" type management is when everything comes from the top down. So we tell every ambassador in every country, "You have to do thus and so," which in a lot of countries really doesn't work and is disregarded or done poorly, or else it's counterproductive, instead of saying, "What should we do?" In a way, this was somewhat going against the trend, which was to come up with an absolute answer or what have you from the State Department.*

GREEN: This, I think, is the way we should proceed more often than we have. As an ambassador in the field, I had come to appreciate the merits of this approach, especially on a sensitive issue. Otherwise, one's tendency is to criticize or to grumble.

When we got these answers back, we spent a great deal of time winnowing them all out. Some of the advice was conflicting. A few ambassadors took a disdainful view about getting involved in women's rights at all anywhere. So we then came up with a directive to the field based upon all these replies. That directive was written in 1978, and we got the signatures of almost all the government departments, including the White House, that were involved. It still was hung up at the top level of the State Department.

When I was retired from the State Department in early 1979, this directive still hadn't gone out. But meanwhile, I'd been named consultant on population, and in that capacity I came back to the Department and attended these meetings. We completed the document, and Under Secretary Dave Newsom was helpful to me in getting Secretary Vance's signature on the directive and sending it to all our posts abroad. I feel that that was one of our greatest accomplishments: enlisting the support of our ambassadors worldwide in promoting the status of rights in women, not simply on the grounds of population issues, by the way, but on higher grounds than just that. This is something we should do anyway.

By the way, this is true of almost all the effective indirect measures to deal with population growth: almost all of the indirect interventions are things that we should do anyway. In other words, lowering infant mortality rates in the long run is going to be very effective, because many people have a lot of children simply because they expect most of them to die. If you could lower mortality rates, then the thinking of people begins to change. So these are the kinds of things--women's rights, lowering infant mortality rates, raising education--those are the three fundamental social programs that we were promoting, and they all had the indirect effect of reducing fertility rates.

*Q: I want to start talking about our policy overseas. Maybe I'm getting overly tangled within Washington. Of course, for any program to work, it depends on the relationship there. Then we'll move overseas. In 1977, a new administration came in--President Jimmy Carter, Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State--with a more human-rights (at least on the surface, anyway), caring more about the situation in the world than of the previous Nixon and Ford Administrations, it would appear. Did you notice a difference?*

GREEN: Yes, I did. I noticed that there was more propensity on the part of the new administration to be involved in these kinds of issues--women's rights, education, child welfare, be it at home or abroad. There was also a shift in Congress to be much more supportive of population programs on the grounds that they addressed the problem of women and children all around the world, women who were suffering from repeated childbearing and wasted health and early death, and children who died at an early age. These were all results of excessive fertility rates--partly, anyway. Therefore, the administration was concerned about this. However, the administration was particularly concerned about human rights. You'd say offhand that human rights would be a supportive concept to what we were doing.

*Q: It would seem to be.*

GREEN: It would seem to be, but, in effect, it was not altogether so. I found myself, for example, having to work with Pat Derian, who was in charge of human rights in the State Department, which meanwhile had become a bureau. It seemed to me that she and all the groups that she was dealing with should make family planning and women's status number-one concerns, but they did not. I read a number of her speeches; they never mentioned this word "population" or the fact that so many women were poor, powerless, and pregnant. Her associates seemed to be oblivious to the realities of the great world outside. They were thinking of it very much in terms of problems of this country.

The other thing was that in talking about human rights, they never talked about human responsibilities. What we, in essence, should be urging was that people and societies should act in a responsible way: that couples should only have those children that they could bring up and feed properly and give a proper education to. We should be talking about emulating countries that were most successful in dealing with population programs, countries like those in East Asia that had the most successful programs, because in those countries there was a strong sense of responsibility!

In other words, human rights in our country had come to overshadow human responsibilities. That was the wrong message. The right message is to combine the two: human rights depend upon human responsibility, and vice versa.

*Q: As you say this, something occurs to me that I'm seeing the effect of, and that is that the liberal movement in the United States, which I would call the Jimmy Carter movement and the civil liberties union and all this, gives so much emphasis to rights, that responsibility does not seem to play as much a role. The problem is that you can see some of the fabric of society coming apart because of the emphasis on rights, rather than on responsibility. Do you think maybe this permeated this?*

GREEN: Of course it did. It was in all our speeches. It was known as being the "battle cry of the new administration." I think it had a very sapping effect on a lot of things that we were seeking to do around the world. I used to talk to Pat Derian about this, I spoke to others about it, but in the climate of Washington at that time, it was not a very popular message.

Just think of it this way. You're a father and you have a son and a daughter. Do you call them into the library to remind them of their rights, or do you call them into the library to remind them of their responsibilities? If you remind them of their rights, what kind of children do they turn out to be if you don't also recommend that they think about responsibilities? They turn out to be permissive, self-indulgent. In a way, we see this in our own country. We're seeing this as a sapping of the moral fiber of nations not to have their young people imbued with a sense of responsibility.

*Q: We're seeing this very much. My wife is a schoolteacher, and she sees this very much in the high schools. This is a problem, more emphasis on rights than on responsibilities.*

*Also, do you think there's this other factor that we've mentioned before, that, after all, the new administration comes in, you can do something maybe to get people immediately to stop torturing other people in other countries, but the long-term results of population control won't be seen by the next five administrations? Do you think, as politicians, this was also a problem, that there was no immediate benefit?*

GREEN: For one thing, we did antagonize a lot of governments with our annual reports on their performance on human rights. At the same time, our widely circulated report could be a stinging rebuke to what they were doing. It was resented, obviously, far more than they would dare express. It also was seen as having some impact upon our aid-giving. Let's bear in mind that when we're talking about population programs, it involves a very strong sense of responsibility on the part of local governments, villages, and people. If our message to the world is one of rights rather than responsibilities, it could be a very dangerous message. And I think it had that effect.

This doesn't mean that we shouldn't pursue human rights, but I'm simply saying it should be weighed. Rights and responsibilities go hand in hand. You cannot have rights without responsibilities. Rights are only possible because people act in a responsible way. If you act irresponsibly, eventually the rights will bring a country down. So that our message should have been that balance. This is what I kept weighing in with Pat Derian and with the administration, and I just didn't seem to get anywhere. They'd agree with me, but they wouldn't do anything about it. This thing became sort of a power of its own.

*Q: Were we talking from a position of strength in the United States, in our under-developed areas, you might call them, the poor people? Were we doing enough in population control so you could say, "Look, we've got this under control. You can do something about it"?*

GREEN: There again, we were in an unfortunate position. First of all, the world population plan of action called upon all countries that had any kinds of population problems to have a population program. We didn't have one. We don't have one to this day. Therefore, for us to preach to other countries that they should have a program, and we didn't have one of our own, was a bit thick. A bit difficult.

Yes, we do have population problems in this country. Try to park a car, you know you have population problems. But our gridlocked cities and congested highways, the difficulties in disposing of waste, environmental deterioration, the smog that is now enveloping our cities, they all attest to the fact that we have population-related problems. That we did not have a population program that addressed these things sort of weakened our position. But you must remember, also, that at that time in the 1960s and 1970s, the United States was a very dominant influence in the world. We were by far the largest donor of aid in those days. Therefore, what we did and thought and acted on made a great deal of difference.

Today it isn't so much so. We're now, relative to the rest of the world, not that powerful. Therefore, our position and recommendations are not given that much currency. So things have

changed. But at that time, particularly in the 1960s and the early 1970s, it made a great deal of difference.

*Q: We're talking about 1975-79. We've talked about the elements in the United States, supportive and divisive. But what did you do in getting the world to talk about this?*

GREEN: There was one thing to continue doing, which we had been doing, and that was putting money into population support programs, either directly or indirectly through non-governmental organizations to help other countries. We could also consult and participate in, international conferences. I went to many of these international conferences, and I was the head of the US delegation to the Population Commission, which met every two years in the United Nations. So we worked with the United Nations. I had meetings about every two months with Bob McNamara, who was head of the World Bank, who was very supportive of population, had written and made strong speeches about the importance of this issue. I found the IMF and the Council of Economic Advisors to the President, shared our kind of thinking.

The real problem gets us into an extensive field, which is a very important one, and not enough attention has been paid to it. That is, what can you do that isn't already being done that is going to be effective in reducing population growth? We've only talked in generalities so far. In my travels, it became clearer and clearer to me that leaders of countries recognized the gravity of this issue, but there was very little evidence that they were personally involved in doing something about it, for reasons that are quite obvious. They, therefore, left this problem in the hands of the minister of health.

I went to any number of African countries where this problem was handled by the minister of health. Ministers of health are not interested in limiting population. On the contrary, they try to bring children into this world healthy, they try to keep the mothers healthy, so maternal child care becomes their principal concern as it relates to this problem. But in terms of trying to reduce fertility rates, they are not interested. If anything, they're interested in the other side of the ledger.

When I would go to these African countries, this repeated itself again and again. I found the minister of health either totally disinterested or hostile to population-control programs, if you want to call it that; "population stabilization" is a little better. Reducing fertility is another way. I found that they were either not interested or hostile, but I found on their staff that there was almost always a woman who was in charge of MCH, maternal child health. They were supportive, because they could see what repeated childbearing was doing to women and to the wasted health of children, and they were very concerned about child spacing and trying to have lower total fertility rates. That brought us back again to this whole question: Did these women have any power? No, they had almost no power, although it was beginning to take effect.

So I began to realize that in these countries, if you were going to get anywhere, one of the things that had to be done was not just the status and rights of women, but that women's organizations, particularly at the village level, should be promoted, supported, advanced. This had all the desirable results that related back to the Carter policy--human rights, women having control of

their bodies, of having better prospects for health for themselves and their children. Therefore, that was going to be, at least for Washington, politically acceptable.

I also found in some of the countries that there were rudimentary organizations of women, even at the marketing-women levels in West Africa. Therefore, we should be using our ambassadors and their staffs, the United Nations, and other organizations to give support to women's organizations. I was just getting deeply involved in this, by the way, when I retired from the State Department. This became more and more a revealed truth to me, that this was one of the ways you could get more effective action in dealing with the problems.

Clearly, what was needed was not to have population put in the hands of the ministers of health, but rather, if anything, put in the hands of the minister of economic planning, or better still, in terms of an interministerial body that was directly answerable to the president of that country or the prime minister, whoever was the number-one power. The top leader should be personally interested. He should have the right organization under him that would be interministerial, because when you're dealing with this problem, as you yourself just mentioned, education is a very important thing. Therefore, the minister of education has to be involved. Obviously, the minister of health has to be involved. The minister of labor is critically important. The minister in charge of local government organizations--we call them the Secretary of Interior, I suppose--but the minister that was in charge of local governments is very important. Of course, the Council of Economic Advisors or the equivalent of that, the minister of the treasury, if you call it that, those people have to be involved.

Anybody who is dealing with economic planning or dealing with the treasury immediately saw the importance of this problem, because these countries were having to use so much of their foreign exchange and of their scarce revenue simply to build more schools and hospitals and houses, and supply more food for their rapidly growing populations. Almost all of their scarce savings were going into infrastructure. Rapid population growth was a dead weight on economic advancement; nothing was left over for development. The only way to get development funds was to borrow money abroad, which they had to pay back. So in effect, population was contributing to the increased indebtedness of these countries, which is now strangling them. Yet if you try to remove and reduce government expenditures and remove subsidies, you're going to have riots, as in Venezuela right now and in Cairo in the past.

The problem was understandable to these leaders, but they didn't have the drive and organization. I often cited the Indonesian model for countries to follow in organizing themselves.

*Q: Indonesia has that equivalent?*

GREEN: That's right. It has what they call the BKKBN, which is the population family-planning council that has representatives of the ministers of all relevant departments and heads up directly to Suharto, who is deeply committed and interested. So in the beginning, when I was dealing with this problem, I was focusing upon organization at the top, and tried to promote an Indonesian type of solution.

What was happening was that the governments were not that interested, and they were not able to exercise enough influence in the context of their huge, slow-moving bureaucracies, and of their rather distant relationships with local governments to get these things going at the grass roots in the villages. So I moved my thinking from focus upon what could be done at the central government level, which was quite clear, which nobody would dispute, to how you were going to translate that into effective action at the village level. I came essentially to the conclusion that . . . [End Tape I, Side 2. Begin Tape II, Side 1]

*Q: Mr. Ambassador, when the tape ended, you were saying your focus had changed from at the top head of the government level to dealing with this problem more at the village level.*

GREEN: Yes. The reason I said that is that these governments change with alarming frequency, and, to be successful, government programs have to carry on year after year for a long period of time, without interruption, without reversing the course too much. Sometimes you have to change policy, but it has to be a sustained effort.

On the other hand, people, of course, come and go. They only live for so long and they're only interested for so long, so what is permanent in this whole structure, then, is only the village or the community in general. It might be in the cities, too, because they have a permanence.

*Q: The real problem is getting to be cities, isn't it?*

GREEN: That's right. I want to come to that, because when I started with this problem, most of the population in these developing countries was on the farms, but in the last ten years, there's been a tremendous surge towards the cities. Therefore, the problem becomes much more focused on what you can do in the cities. When I was dealing with this thing, the preponderant populations were in rural areas, and people were being forced off the farms by the fragmentation of land holdings and also by the attractions of the cities, and they were beginning to flood into the cities.

So the problem, as you suggest, began to change. But to go back, you still want to keep the people on the farms, to the extent possible, and prevent this enormous surge to overcrowded cities. So therefore, population programs have to be rooted to the maximum extent possible in village life. Furthermore, people are going to be most receptive and supportive of programs that take place within their own visible horizons that improve conditions of life in their own villages. In other words, it has to be commended to them in terms of their own self-interest.

You've got to be able to demonstrate to somebody in a village why it's going to be better to them if they can limit family size. This can be done. Quite clearly, the fragmentation of land holdings and forcing people off the land is something that people don't like. They're seeing all their younger people now going into the cities, and more and more farming is left in the hands of the very old and the very young and the women. So if you can show why it's in the interest of the village, and you can show why it's worth their while, why it pays off to have smaller families, then I think you're beginning to make some real headway on the problem. At least so it would seem to be in theory.

The difficulty, again, with villages is that you have to have somebody in that village who is sufficiently interested and knowledgeable who is going to take the lead and carry some weight with the villagers. You have to have some kind of enlightened spirit, you might say. If you look around the world, India is a very good example of it. You'll find population programs are effective in certain blocks. Blocks have about 110,000 people in them. It almost always turns out that, where a block's program is successful, there's some guiding spirit in that particular block who is concerned and has natural leadership qualities, and he takes the thing under control.

One of the advantages of a village approach is the idea of development from the grass roots upward, rather than the trickle-down theory, putting a lot of money in big ticket projects that will eventually benefit the people down the line. The trickle-down approach had already been discredited pretty much by the time I was involved in population. I found there was a good deal more interest in AID when there was a grass-roots upward kind of approach to development. You come across a number of villages where this is really working, because you have that guiding spirit. When you don't have that guiding spirit, it doesn't work and you can't create it. So that becomes a limitation on what you really achieve that way.

So having gone through years in tramping through villages, slum areas, and things like that, seeing where it works and where it doesn't work, I came increasingly to the conclusion that the village approach is going to work in those countries where you already have a strong village structure, which you have in Indonesia. But where you have a weak structure, for example, as in Pakistan and Bangladesh and parts of India, that approach fails.

*Q: We're talking about social pressure.*

GREEN: Yes. For example, in Indonesia, you found that the village chief is keenly interested, because he knows the man up the line is keenly interested. Eventually, Suharto was interested. Also the military are very interested, and they're all beholden to the military. So when you have that power at the top, people down the line pay more attention.

Also, in Indonesia you found that the wives in the village formed wives' clubs and there was a great deal of peer pressure on everybody to keep down family size. They had to report what they were doing, the number of fertilities, and you found a lot of these villages would set up their own voluntary quotas of who was going to have how many children, the kind of thing done in China on a draconian basis but was being done on a voluntary basis in Indonesia in many of these villages.

So where you have a strong feeling of community, that approach is going to be successful, particularly if it's married into a kind of incentive program, where if that village achieves a certain lowering of fertility rates, it gets higher priority in terms of government-support programs. I suggested to a number of governments that they should put up a big billboard in the village, saying, "If we bring down our fertility rates in this village, the government will award us by whatever we in the village most want, within the means of the government." That could be the building of a mosque, for example, or of a road, or of a rice milling plant. In Egypt, rewards took

the form of bee farms because an apiary was a way of extra income, and people wanted it. However, such projects failed in Egypt due to various factors.

So these ideas of how to introduce incentives at the village level were of great interest to me. In Bangladesh and Thailand there were small banking concerns or a small village banker who would extend small loans at very low rates to those who practiced family planning or limited family size.

*Q: Had you developed the equivalent of a sort of think tank, where bright young people were using the powers of the American Government, the embassies and all, to come up with ideas, and then you'd filter these out and propose them?*

GREEN: Curiously, the embassies had very little understanding of what I'm talking about. They had very little contact with villages. You found possibly more in Africa than you did in other places.

*Q: Probably because of the localities. In a capital, you deal with a ruling class who don't have a problem, for the most part.*

GREEN: There was another thing in Africa that we had introduced, and that was a kind of ambassadorial fund, where the ambassador had up to \$25,000 a year that he could use as he wished. Many of them were using the fund to tie in with the village, because it gave ambassadors the excuse to go out to that village and to see it at close hand, and then give them something.

I spoke to many of our ambassadors and tried to get them to get into population family-planning health projects, which they did. In Africa, they were in many ways closer to the people, even though the governments of those countries in Africa were not very close to the people. They weren't very close to the tribal groups. They were seen as sort of "out there." African governments had closer connections with capitals of other countries than with their own people. There was a kind of isolation. But we had a lot of good ambassadors who wanted to get out among the people. Many on our staffs were really dedicated, and it was a pleasure working with them and talking with them.

*Q: Could you describe worst and best cases, examples you had in your time?*

GREEN: I knew East Asia best, of course, of all the parts of the world, and this was the area of the world where the programs were most successful. It goes back, basically, to a very strong Confucian ethic of responsibility which I spoke about before, of dedication to family, dedication to community, dedication to nation. Strong family system, strong village system, and so forth. So the programs we are talking about worked best in East Asia. Not everywhere. In the Philippines, it was with rather indifferent results. The Vatican bore much of a responsibility for the failure of some of these programs. Not that the barrio priests were opposed; they were supportive. But the cardinal and others at the top generally were weighing in against the program, especially the Opus Dei as an organization began to become more and more influential.

Q: *Opus Dei is sort of a militant arm.*

GREEN: That's right. It's a right-wing Catholic activist group.

Q: *It started in Spain.*

GREEN: Each one of these countries involves quite a long story. I was deeply involved in the population program in the Philippines. I had many meetings with President Marcos and his wife, who basically were quite supportive.

Let me just say, in general, the programs worked best in East Asia for the reasons that I mention right now, plus the fact that they were beginning to make very rapid economic progress. There's no question that economic progress does have a favorable impact on the problem. Korea is a very good example of that, and Taiwan. Both of them brought their fertility rate down, largely because of economic breakthroughs. But you're not going to have economic breakthroughs when rampant growth of population denies the capacity of a country to progress economically.

There was some progress also in Latin America, especially in South America. Mexico was beginning to make some in-roads into this problem. The glaring exception, where no real progress was made, was in Central America. That was a matter of great concern to our ambassadors. As a matter of fact, our ambassador in San Salvador sent in a telegram in 1976 reflecting the views of the country team that I found one of the most perceptive analyses of a country that I've ever seen, in which population was identified as the major basic problem in the country, where it had been responsible for the "Soccer" War with Honduras back in the 1960s, but where they pointed out how population was causing an increasing polarization of society between the very wealthy and the very poor, and that this was inevitably going to bring about an internal clash of momentous proportions.

The countries where there was least progress was Africa and various parts of the Middle East and South Asia. In other words, there was a kind of band that ran all the way across the globe from Burma on the east, all the way to Senegal on the west, where population programs were not working for one reason or another. There were exceptions, and, as I say, there were certain states in India that were making progress, especially Kerala in the south, and Sri Lanka was making some. There were some exceptions, but by and large, those countries had the highest fertility rates and they were making the least in-roads in this problem, and population growth threatened those countries the most. I might add that our interests were deeply engaged, especially in the Middle East, in a worsening of social and socio-political conditions in those countries.

I increasingly used the strategic argument for reducing population growth, drawing on arguments which General Max Taylor had made in speeches. But, it was a delicate issue to raise, because you didn't want people to think you were advocating it for strategic reasons of interest to the U. S. Basically, the interests of all of mankind are tied up in what happens in programs in any one country. This was especially true in the Middle East where the United States and other countries had a major strategic stake, but where population was threatening the stability of most Middle East countries.

Look at the report prepared by the George Ball Presidential Commission just after our hostages were seized.

George Ball, in his report to the President, identified population as being one of the basic causes of the unrest prevalent in Iran, pointing out how people swarming in the slums of South Tehran, in particular, became a restive, frustrated force that was very amenable to extremist voices and to the Ayatollah's clarion call. Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt were all countries where the United States had a major strategic interest and where population threatened to undermine the stability of those countries. Egypt was a splendid case in point, and while I was still in that job in the State Department, I made about three trips to Egypt. Since that time I've made several more. I've been in direct touch with Sadat, when he was still alive, and with Mubarak. I have made presentations before the Supreme Council of Egypt and before the Cabinet. I found that they were increasingly concerned about population growth, especially Mubarak, but where they found it very difficult to handle effectively.

*Q: Is the problem religion?*

GREEN: Religion is a major problem. Mubarak's up against the fundamentalist Islamic groups. The last conversation I had with Sadat was after I left the State Department. This was the year of his assassination in 1981. Six months before that, I had a meeting with him in his home in Cairo and his wife was there. We talked about the population problems. I put on a micro-computer presentation. At the end, we started talking about overcrowded Cairo. He was talking about the breakdown of parental disciplines and how children wandering around loose in the streets were being proselytized by the extremist groups. The last remark he made to me on that point--in fact, the last words he ever mentioned to me--was, "It's an absolute nightmare, Mr. Ambassador." Six months later he was assassinated by these same urban terror gangs.

So it was clear that countries in which we had a major strategic stake were being threatened from within. We could put all the amount of weaponry and train all the military we want--and we put a lot of money into Iran and tried to help--and what happens? If they go down the drain, they can turn out to be hostile forces.

*Q: Egypt certainly comes to mind, doesn't it?*

GREEN: Yes.

*Q: In order to balance off Israel, we have loaded Egypt down, but have not really made any real progress with the population. We're talking now in 1989.*

GREEN: That's right.

*Q: Let's talk about modalities. How did you go about this? Let's take Egypt. What did we try to do there from your point of view? You look at Egypt, you see a target. What do you do about it?*

GREEN: When I visited Egypt the first time in 1978 on population business, the Egyptian Government had just come under sharp criticism from the World Bank for its failure to address this problem. Bob McNamara was all for limiting World Bank loans until they addressed this issue. He really wanted to put the arm on them to address the problem. Otherwise, it was just money down the drain.

When I went to Egypt, I ran into several problems. I'm very glad you brought this example to mind, because in essence, they reflect the problems that I ran into almost everywhere. The first thing that I ran into was an American ambassador who made the observation: "Marshall, you know, until they settle this problem in the Middle East (basically the problem of divided Palestine), you can't expect the Egyptians ever to address this issue." And he meant it.

I said, "But they're never going to solve that problem. Do you mean to say population issues will meanwhile be neglected?"

He said, "I'm afraid that's the reality."

I went back to the hotel that night, and I couldn't sleep, I was so churned up over that conversation. I knew there was truth in what he said, but if that was going to be the attitude of our ambassador and of the government, what hope was there that we could really do anything in a country like Egypt?

So the following day, he introduced me to the number-two man in the government, the head of their whole economic steering group. I think he had the title of deputy prime minister. I found him to be, on the other hand, rather supportive of doing something about it, and he recognized the gravity, because he was an economist. But the ambassador, Hermann Eilts, a very bright fellow, very able, had this view. He thought it would be helpful to me to meet the Grand Sheik of Alazar. That was the big university in Cairo, but he was also regarded as sort of the spiritual leader of Islam.

*Q: He's certainly of the Sunni faith.*

GREEN: That's right. They have a Department of Islamic Studies in the university that is very important in the Moslem world. He suggested I meet with him, and that arrangement was made through the deputy prime minister. I met with him, and it was one of the most frustrating meetings I've ever been to in my life. First of all, it took place in a great, large hall, in which we sat off in a corner, and we were all lined up in a row: Ambassador Eilts, I, the Grand Sheik, and his interpreter.

*Q: This is the medjlis, which is the way almost all business is conducted in the Middle East.*

GREEN: This was my first exposure to it. I made my little pitch, and then the Grand Sheik said, "No, we don't have a population problem. You don't understand us here. We have all this land. As you arrived, you observed that Egypt's population is compressed in this narrow Nile Valley, but we have far more land. It's untenanted. We can fill it up. We can make the desert bloom!"

I said, "It was my understanding, Your Excellency, that making the desert bloom has been a very intensive effort on the part of the Egyptian Government, with vast amounts of foreign assistance, and you haven't been able to do very much. You've expanded your crop lands along the banks of the Nile about as far as you can go. Any additional hectare brought into cultivation is going to cost enormous amounts of money. It's just not going to be effective."

"Ah," he said, "no, no, no, Mr. Ambassador. You're wrong. We can make the desert bloom if we just work hard enough and we get enough assistance." He was absolutely obdurate at that point. I never got any further with him on that subject.

I left that meeting very, very depressed about the mentality of some of these spiritual leaders of the Moslem world. I was dealing with very different leaders, you might say, from the Indonesian leaders, who were Moslems and who saw the problem in a very realistic light. In other words, you're dealing with very different mentalities. It isn't the fact that they're Moslems; it's the fact that they're traditionalists and they're extremists, and you're dealing with a kind of religious fervor.

*Q: One doesn't have to go much farther than the head of the Catholic Church.*

GREEN: That's right. So I rather despaired at that first meeting. I also found that there was a great problem in the Egyptian Government that reflected a little bit the problem that I had with AID. It was the fact that the minister of health was totally uninterested in any kind of motivational programs, whereas the man who was in charge of the population program of Egypt wasn't interested in family planning and was totally interested in things like women's rights and the oblique, indirect long-term approach. They were absolutely deadlocked. They had no communication, no common program, although they were setting up, while I was there, a new Supreme Council on Population. So there were the beginnings of trying to bring this thing together, but it was very, very frustrating.

In the case of Egypt, you have the encapsulation of the types of problems where you have our ambassador and leaders who have got to settle other problems before they get to population and where religious focus have an enormous amount of power.

*Q: We're talking about the seven blind men and the elephant. One is seeing the problem as a problem of Palestine; the other is seeing the problem of the Nile. Each one is seeing one small part, rather than looking at the whole thing.*

GREEN: But to go back to Egypt, in retirement I did go out to Egypt four or five times at the request of the government. I put on presentations to the Supreme Council with all the important ministers there, plus Mrs. Sadat. The following year I put on a presentation to President and Mrs. Sadat, and also to members of their legislature.

Two years later, after Sadat was assassinated and Mubarak became president, at his request I went out and had one of the most satisfying meetings I've ever had in my life. There I met with

Mubarak, with all the leading members of his Cabinet, with about 14 of the governors, and with leading members of the press.

In this huge gathering, I put on a presentation that had been carefully worked out, and was called a RAPID presentation. That's an acronym for a type of presentation in which, using the latest in microcomputer technology, you present, projected onto TV screens, the adverse impact of population on the ability of the country to realize its development goals, be it in terms of agriculture production, or of balance of payments, or of urban planning, or school and hospital construction costs.

So you're able to present to them, using their own statistics and projections, how totally unrealizable those plans are, given population projections. Then you showed that if they moved to an average three-child family--they had four or five then--how much more realizable these would be, but they would still be terrible disasters, whereas if they moved to a two-child family by the year 2000, then a lot of these things could be resolved.

So I put on this presentation with a very able assistant, Tom Golliver of the Futures Group, and it made a great impression, at the end of which Mubarak said, "Mr. Ambassador, you have made a very impressive presentation and one, I am sure, that we will all take to heart." They asked for the comments of people around the table. One of the ministers--I've forgotten which one--used the old argument about making the deserts bloom. "We have enough land," he said. "We should send out people. Americans developed the West. We should move out into the deserts and do the same."

Mubarak said, very dryly, as dry as the desert, "Mr. Minister, I suggest you be the first one to go." They all roared with laughter. At that moment, Mubarak won my heart. I thought, "Here is a man who has a good sense of humor, who, at the same time, is preaching the right gospel."

Since then, the population program, although it made a major advance for a short time, eventually collapsed, or at least I don't believe it's made much progress since then. I haven't been out to Egypt for about four years now, so all I'm saying is hearsay. Egypt hasn't made the progress that one would have hoped, even though the president is deeply committed and interested. I'm afraid it goes right back to what Hermann Eilts said to me one time, and which I rejected (and, unfortunately, there's a great deal of truth in it) that until Egypt can resolve basic Middle East strategic issues, population is not going to be given the front and center attention it deserves.

*Q: You mentioned before that in dealing with population, abortion had not become an issue. Today in 1989, we have had three elections on which abortion has been almost a bugaboo. Particularly with the Reagan Administration, and the Bush Administration now in its second month, is this a fake issue, or has this inhibited? Is this a problem? I'm speaking about the time you were dealing with this problem.*

GREEN: When I was dealing with this problem, abortion was not a problem. I very carefully stayed away from it. I knew the sensitivities about it. I knew it would impair the effectiveness of

my presentations. I made many speeches, by the way, all over our country and around the world. I attended many conferences. I always stayed away from the subject of abortion. When it arose, I just said, "Obviously we all want to prevent abortion from occurring, and therefore family planning is important, because it lessens its occurrence." But beyond that, I didn't get involved in the ethics and the ethical issues and questions of when does life first occur. That I stayed away from. Also, it wasn't much of an issue.

Abortion became an issue during the Reagan Administration, a very major issue. It was whopped up by Right to Life extremists and the Right to Life group was one of these single-issue groups whose votes would be solely conditioned upon what the Reagan Administration did in terms of denouncing and making abortion illegal. Therefore, they commanded enormous disproportionate power, because that's the only issue on which they judged their votes. So the Republican Party and the Democrats, to some extent, were wooing these Right to Life groups, and therefore adopted the anti-abortion position of those groups. They were also under a great deal of pressure not just from the Catholic Church, but, unfortunately, from a great deal of the Evangelistic groups which had a similar view. There was a kind of religious union on this issue between most evangelical groups and the Roman Catholic Church.

1984 was a critical year. I'm now talking about a period that occurred after I left the State Department, but where, as I have said, I've been deeply involved for the last nine or ten years outside of the State Department in dealing with these issues, in some ways more effectively, not being in the government. I've been able to do things that I couldn't otherwise do.

In 1984, we had the second World Conference on Population that took place in Mexico City. The position that we were to take at this conference became a matter of great moment in Washington. I was a director of an advocacy group known as the Population Crisis Committee, which has about 35 full-time staffers. It's a well-known organization and has influence on the Hill. We do a great deal of lobbying for AID on population on the Hill. We still do, and I'm still an active member of it. Accompanied by General William Westmoreland, a fellow Population Crisis Committee director, I called on Westmoreland's close friend, James Baker. James Baker, at that time, was the President's number one assistant, along with Meese. We were concerned about the position to be taken by the American delegation at Mexico City, because we already had rumors that the Right to Lifers were having a great deal of influence on White House policy, and possibly on the appointment of the head of our delegation.

So we went to the White House, had a meeting with Jim Baker. I made my presentation. I thought it was effective; Bill Westmoreland thought so; and Jim Baker indicated as much. He put me in touch with Jim Cicconi, who was his special assistant, and still, I think, has considerable clout with Mr. Baker. We argued that the head of our delegation to the World Population Conference should be young William Draper, at that time head of the Ex-Im Bank, and who had a great deal of influence in the Republican Party and was a very able man. We got the impression that Jim Baker agreed; he certainly indicated that.

The next morning, Westmoreland had breakfast with Ed Meese. I wasn't there. I didn't know Ed Meese. But Ed Meese also indicated that our position would be given serious consideration and probable support. We also met with the head of B.O.B. and so forth.

As it turned out, the position that we thought they had adopted was reversed. We don't know who reversed it or why it was reversed: probably someone even closer to the President than Baker or Meese.

So when it came time for the delegation to be named, it wasn't Draper. It wasn't Surgeon General Koop. We thought it might be, and we thought he was too anti-abortionist to be reflective of our position, so we had opposed him, which is regrettable. They settled on a former senator from New York, who, in fact, was my next-door neighbor here for a number of years. This former senator who headed our delegation was Senator James Buckley.

*Q: Was he Catholic?*

GREEN: Yes, he was an ardent supporter of the Vatican. But, when I knew him during the Nixon Administration, we never talked about that, because that's when I was assistant secretary. On this issue, he took an uncompromising position and ordered the preparation of a paper for the Mexico City conference by the White House staff, not by the State Department or AID.

The government at that time was very much under the influence not only of Right-to-Lifers, but also by a certain professor, Julian Simon, who had written a book called The Ultimate Resource, the "ultimate resource" being people. He had the theory that the more people in the world, the better it was for the economy of the world. It was a totally specious argument, but anyway, it had a great deal of support in the administration, because it was saying the kinds of things the administration liked, and that was more of a laissez faire approach, that governments in these countries were very poorly organized, and that until they straightened out their organization, there wasn't much they could do about these issues, and that the biggest drag on development in the world was mismanagement. It wasn't population; population was just incidental. Therefore, population basically was a neutral issue, one that didn't really deserve much attention.

Our delegation adopted this position which caused agony within the administration and on the Hill. They had two sets of hearings with regard to this draft position that we were to take to Mexico City. I testified at both of them and so did other members of our organization. We knocked it very hard, and I think we had basically a very sympathetic hearing, because the committee hearing was mostly attended by representatives who believed in population programs.

Before our delegation went to Mexico City, Buckley left off the delegation my successor, Dick Benedick, who was very able, knowledgeable, and articulate. They left him off the delegation, which was a terrible slap at all we'd been doing in the State Department. Buckley had on the delegation from AID an American black (he was on the delegation basically for that reason) who was opposed to population programs. Therefore, even though Bill Draper was a member of the delegation, the delegation was heavily weighted in favor of those supporting the Buckley position.

The position that we took at Mexico City astounded the delegates. They thought the United States was going to return once again as leader of efforts worldwide to deal with this issue and be

supportive. On the contrary, Buckley stunned the conference with negative talk about population being a neutral issue, neither this nor that, and what was wrong was mismanagement, thereby really criticizing all the countries there. It was an absolute disaster. An absolute disaster, from which we've never recovered--never recovered.

One of the worst things about that conference was that, aside from what I've said, including the effective dismissal of my successor Dick Benedick, Buckley did something that was almost unique in diplomatic annals of singling out a country for criticism. He criticized the population program in China on the grounds of its being coercive. He went on to announce that the United States was considering withdrawing its support from both the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, to which we had been giving upwards of \$30 million a year, and to the International Planned Parenthood Federation, IPPF, to which we had been giving about \$17 million a year for population programs, on the grounds that both of those international organizations, one a public government organization, the other a private organization, were helping to fund programs in China and that China's programs, by definition, were coercive, and we would therefore not have any part or parcel with programs that were coercive. Therefore, we were considering withdrawal of funds, which we eventually did.

[End Tape II, Side 1. Begin Tape II, Side 2]

GREEN: We were talking about the Mexico City conference, and especially what Buckley, the head of our delegation, had to say criticizing China's population program. It did, in fact, result in the United States withdrawing its support from the United Nations Fund for Population Activities and from the IPPF.

In withdrawing those funds, we in the Population Crisis Committee felt, a feeling generally shared in most governments and non-governmental organizations, that our action, taken in the name of opposition to abortion, would, in fact, result in far more abortions occurring, because the denial of \$47 million a year, roughly, from population programs, almost all of which went into contraception of one type or another, meant that there would be that much less available in the way of avoiding unwanted births, and there would be that much more incidence of abortion. We estimated that there probably would be upwards of 500,000 more abortions a year as a result of the Reagan Administration's policies than would have otherwise have occurred.

*Q: I hate to sound partisan in this, but isn't this much more for show, really?*

GREEN: Of course, for political reasons. The Right to Life groupers were single-issue voters in this country, that the world suffers for it.

*Q: Looking on this with some perspective of five years away from that, the Reagan Administration has gone, although some are back in there. Can you think of any of the forces within the White House that you feel were behind this? You said Meese and Baker were.*

GREEN: One of the people who was obviously against this was Senator Helms and all of his henchmen, and he had people as advisors in the White House. Faith Whittlesey, who is Mrs.

Reagan's personal advisor, was closely tied in with the Helms group. I think she wielded a great deal of influence. So I think it comes down to something that happened behind the scenes, and I can well imagine what did happen. I just don't want to say how it happened. It was a disaster of the first order for anybody who was in this field. We have not yet recovered from it.

Meanwhile, Congress did continue to vote funds for population programs, but there were more and more constraints placed upon recipients of our funds. There was more and more concern that our funds not be used in any way, directly or indirectly, in any program that had any kind of undue influence on women to accept contraception. What is undue influence?

One of the things that they ruled out was any kind of incentive programs or disincentive programs. To me, this was a very serious blow. Clearly, one of the things that has to be done--and I mentioned this earlier on--is to make reducing family size worth the while of people who did so, bearing in mind that having large families is seen not just as rooted in tradition, but as being possibly the wise economic decision to make.

*Q: It's a form of social insurance.*

GREEN: That's right.

*Q: Having children to take care of you in your old age.*

GREEN: That's right.

*Q: And work your farm.*

GREEN: Also working on the farms, you did need a lot of children. Or if you were a fisherman, you wanted to have a son, at least two sons, who could man your ship. So whatever it was, children were seen as an asset.

In a country like Egypt--and this is a point I neglected to point out earlier on, but it's a very important one--children can get jobs more easily than their parents. Children get very low-paying jobs. They can pick the boll weevils off of cotton, they also can shine shoes and run errands, and they can do all kinds of things at very low cost. If you're a very poor family, having four or five kids running around doing these kinds of things can be seen as an asset.

Furthermore, all bread in Egypt is sold at four cents a pound which is way below cost. It's heavily subsidized. Therefore, the economic penalties of having a child are very low, bread being obviously a major component. There are also transportation and other kinds of subsidies.

Therefore, you don't pay much for children, and children can bring in an economic return. A further complication, going back to this four cents a pound for bread, is the fact that Egypt is becoming more and more dependent upon imported grains and bread, essentially, wheat, and less and less productive of their own. Subsidized imported grains obviously discourages farmers; they can't grow wheat or whatever in Egypt at competitive cost. Therefore, they abandon the farms. You find agriculture being neglected.

There's one final point that I want to make here that's a terribly important point. I made this point when I first took over the job. One of our aid directors had made the observation in congressional testimony that nobody paid much attention to, but it was a very important point. This was Bill Gaud. This was in 1976. Bill Gaud pointed out that the United States Government is spending 14 times as much money on aid programs that have the effect of lowering death rates, basically food and nutritional programs, as it is spending on programs that has the effect of reducing fertility rates. Therefore, our aid program was having the unfortunate total impact of aggravating the problem through reducing death rates and increasing longevity.

Certainly we don't want to increase mortality rates; we want to lower them. We want to do everything we can to improve health and lower mortality rates. But if that is our purpose, then we are all the more to balance the ledgers in these countries by helping them reduce fertility rates. We should be putting much more muscle and money and effort and counsel into this type of program.

*Q: In 1979, you left. How did you feel about what you had accomplished at that point?*

GREEN: Well, I was not very satisfied. I was satisfied that I'd made the decision, yes. I had sacrificed a good deal in doing it. While I was still in the position of Population Coordinator, I had been offered the assistant secretaryship of two bureaus, as well as ambassador to two countries, one of which, Japan, I almost got, but which was given to somebody else, Mike Mansfield, for reasons I'd rather not go into right now. Of course, Mike has done a magnificent job, so I'm not regretting it in terms of our country's interest. But naturally, to me that would have been something that I would have taken. That would have been the only job of those offered to me that I would have readily taken, giving up work in the population field. It was that important to me, population. The other interest in my life, of course, has been Japan and China, and our relationship with those countries.

But I left with some regrets, but also with some feelings of reward that I at least had contributed to a better understanding of the magnitude of this problem and the kinds of things that were necessary to do if you were going to effectively cope with it. I felt that I had contributed to greater awareness in our government and other governments in population issues, as seen by leaders and diplomats and not just by health officials, doctors, demographers, and family planners. Those disciplines were already aware of what the problem was, but they saw it from their own professional viewpoints.

I was trying to look at it from the totality viewpoint, the point of view of how a leader and a citizen of tomorrow would see this problem, of what we'd done today about it, and feeling that we were stewards of this world during our lifetime, and we were supposed to leave the world a better place for our children. Neglect of this issue, to me, was an admission that we had not carried out our stewardship properly. I felt that this is something which should weigh on the conscience of all people who were concerned with the future of this world and of the well being of their children and grandchildren. I felt that we were much too short-ranged in our viewpoint. I could understand why it was so, but it was regrettable.

Did we have any capability to plan and work for the future? Could any long-range programs ever really be carried out by any country in this world? I wasn't sure. I remember, in that regard, that Albert Schweitzer had once said, "We are losing the capability to foresee and forestall. We will end by destroying the earth." I think, in a way, that's what's happening right now. We have been unable to foresee and forestall, especially with regard to population and environment. "Population" is the key problem we've neglected.

*Q: Maybe we can foresee, but we're not doing anything about it.*

GREEN: By way of conclusion, may I say what kinds of things can be done that are not being done, that lie within the realm of possibility, given all of the kinds of mental makeup of leaders that I've experienced. I think that in the developing world, the problems of population have got to be related to things that work, that are possible, that they should be tied in with what we see as trends in the thinking and the capabilities of this world.

We know that we're living in an age of revolution in communications. We now have earth satellites. We now have television in homes. There's a great capability there for projecting programs and video cassettes and things like that, of getting the message out. But the message should be directed at why it is in the interest of individuals to have a smaller family.

What can be shown on these video cassettes in most of these countries is that if you have one healthy child who can earn good money, you can have much more in the way of social security protection in your old age than if you have a lot of children who are all weak or can make no money. If you could raise one child--you could make stories of these things--one child who has enough in the way of support, for good education and vocational training (including for a job overseas), he is going to be able to remit money to you.

*Q: You've got to say "he/she."*

GREEN: Yes. He or she will be able to remit money to you that is going to be far beyond anything you could expect from a lot of uneducated children. The very fact that you have a lot of children in the developing world means that none of them are going to be able to have that opportunity and advantage.

What I'm saying, basically, is to try to tie in your message with what is going to be in their interest to do. Another thing that you can do is that in every government there are huge numbers of government workers--the railroads and aviation industry, the Army, and in the bureaucracy. All those people are on government payrolls, and you surely have some kind of access to them and some ways of influencing them. There's no reason in the world why governments cannot reward those couples that have a family of the size that the state wants. This is not penalizing couples. It is rewarding those attentive to the needs of their societies.

This is already being done in a number of industries in India. I found that in Rajasthan state, which is one of the most progressive states in India, a number of the textile plants, about 14 of them, I think, are now using this kind of incentive of giving an extra amount of salary to workers

that limit the size of their family. As long as it's limited, they continue to receive a bonus. This is designed to be an offset to having those two or three sons that people count on. This, again, gets at the real roots of the problem.

I am a strong advocate of that type of a program, but I must say it's not being done widely. I would like to spend more time on this particular aspect of the problem.

The third thing is that I would begin to put my family-planning resources more and more into the cities. You mentioned this earlier on, and you were right, because in the cities, there is no need for large families. You don't have farms requiring a lot of kids. Secondly, excessive numbers of youths can be a disaster for that city in terms of providing essential services and in terms of dangers they pose to the government through restiveness, unemployment, and so forth. Everybody in the city has an interest in seeing that the size of that city is kept down. The principal reason for urban overcrowding is not migration to the city these days; it is the natural increase in the cities.

By the way, the people coming to the cities are mostly young people in their fertility years. So you'll find that urban fertility rates sometimes are higher than in the adjoining countryside.

Since people in urban areas want smaller families, there's much more of a natural demand in cities for modern family planning. You're going to find higher user rates in cities and more success stories. People in the rural areas tend to follow the example of the cities. If the cities are making out with smaller families, this message is telegraphed to the countryside.

I remember reading the report of one kid who went back to his hometown in Gambia. He had been in the university in Bathurst. He went back to his home folks there, and he began to be the sort of local seer as to what everybody should do. It was a very interesting report. This I've seen repeated elsewhere. So the message begins to spread out from these young educated people to their home folks, that this is the way of the future.

Greater use must be made of all of the means that we now have at our command: government structures, women's rights and education, a revolution in communications, new job opportunities, incentives and rewards to bring down excessive population growth rates.

*Q: Mr. Ambassador, this has been a fascinating look at an operation that is obviously vital and of the essence, as far as where we're going in the world today. I appreciate you sharing your experiences. Thank you.*

GREEN: You're welcome, Stu.

*End of interview*